

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS:

1. The unusually long consensus between the executive and legislative branches of state government, the California Highway Commission and Caltrans that gave support and direction to the development of the California highway for a generation after World War II no longer exists.
2. The legal framework in which the Highway Commission and the department operate is so inadequate for a time of uncertainty over the direction of a state transportation program that the Commission can no longer effectively exercise its role as a transportation policy-setting entity. Caltrans has regularly ignored or contravened the actions of the Highway Commission.
3. The breakdown in the framework provided by consensus and law has allowed Caltrans to operate in a unilateral fashion during the past year without being subjected to the normal system of checks and balances, a privilege that no other department of state government enjoys.
4. The erosion of the institutional framework has strengthened Caltrans' monopoly on information regarding its program to such an extent that the integrity of the information is being questioned inside and outside state government.

5. The Highway Commission's narrowness of perspective and limited scope of authority render it incapable of fairly addressing multimodal transportation issues.
6. The State Transportation Board, being unable to provide strong, affirmative leadership in the development of the California Transportation Plan has abrogated that responsibility to the Secretary of Business and Transportation.
7. The state transportation planning process has suffered from the inattention of Caltrans management and has never been integrated fully into the ongoing activities of the Department.
8. Caltrans is reluctant to participate in mass transportation development because of an unclear mandate to develop and operate any transportation mode other than highways.
9. The senior career management of Caltrans has attempted, under a succession of Directors, to provide organizational stability by redefining the character of the highway program in light of fiscal constraints, community disenchantment with the program and widely expressed environmental concerns.
10. The department is so poorly organized that the senior operational managers of the department, especially the directors of Caltrans' eleven districts, are often uncertain where responsibility rests for various aspects of the Department programs and receive conflicting direction from Sacramento--all of which only exacerbates the traditional conflict between the districts and the central office.

11. The broad-ax approach mandated by personnel laws and regulations combined with the uncertainty in a new administration's transportation policies yield a reduction in the Caltrans' work force which when combined with a sudden shift in hampered program emphasis ability to carry out the 1976-77 budget.
12. The six-year highway program promulgated by the director offers no direction to Caltrans after 1982, thus eliminating any reasonable long-term program planning.
13. The allocation formulas for distributing gasoline tax revenue between the regions of California, among the Caltrans districts and the county minimum originated when the State was predominately rural and do not take into account the highway and urban transit requirements of today.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The California Highway Commission, the State Transportation Board, the Aeronautics Board and the California Toll Bridge Authority should be abolished and their activities assigned to a California Transportation Commission.
2. Appointees to the Commission should include individuals, appointed by the Governor as well as by the Senate and the Assembly, who are not legislators.
3. The Director devote more attention to the internal organization of Caltrans.

4. An internal reorganization be undertaken of Caltrans that will remove the costly and unnecessary duplication of effort associated with the bureaucratic struggles between Financial Management, the Division of Highways, and Engineering and Operations.
5. The forecasting and cash management functions should be centralized into a single unit.
6. The Commission should have a small professional staff to provide it with an independent analysis of transportation issues.
7. The practice of continuously appropriating the State Highway Account Funds to the California Highway Commission should be discontinued.
8. The commission should be responsible for adopting a transportation plan, providing policy direction to Caltrans, and recommending to the Legislature and the Governor the department's annual budget.
9. The Legislature should budget funds from the State Highway Account for specific program categories, with responsibility for the selection of specific projects resting with the California Transportation Commission.
10. Caltrans retain outside technical expertise to review and where appropriate, reform its economic forecasting methods, revenue estimating process, and its accounting system.

11. The California Transportation Plan should contain both a near-term (four-year) investment program and a long-term (eight to ten years) transportation development program. The commission should annually or biennially update the plan.
12. The requirement that the Legislature adopt goals and objectives should be abolished and assigned to the Transportation Commission.
13. The California Transportation Plan should serve as a guide for this organization of work effort within Caltrans.
14. The Caltrans "needs study" and the other efforts to identify highway and local road needs should be broader to include other modes of transportation and be fully integrated into the transportation planning process.
15. The Secretary of Business and Transportation should immediately return the responsibility for transportation planning to Caltrans. In the absence of legislation to the contrary, the Department should resume the planning in such a fashion as to complement its activities and meet the requirements of law.