



State of California

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION

January 31, 2002

The Honorable Gray Davis
Governor of California

The Honorable John Burton
President pro Tempore of the Senate
and members of the Senate

The Honorable Robert M. Hertzberg
Speaker of the Assembly
and members of the Assembly

The Honorable James L. Brulte
Senate Minority Leader

The Honorable Dave Cox
Assembly Minority Leader

Dear Governor and Members of the Legislature:

In the weeks since the terrorist attacks on America, civic leaders throughout California have responded by guarding against immediate threats and planning for the possibility of ever-present dangers. Public budgets have been altered to reflect new priorities. Long-planned security measures have been accelerated. In city halls and the state Capitol, anxious moments have spurred swift decisions.

We should be proud of this bias toward action. And now it is time to think long-term.

California – because of its geography, its size and its prosperity – is vulnerable to increasing losses from disasters, be they accidents of nature or engineered by enemies. Officials assert that California is well prepared for such adversity because it has learned from its legacy of earthquakes, fires and floods. But the scale and sophistication of recent events illustrate the need to be more innovative to ensure that Californians can respond to what could reasonably occur. Complacency would be a mistake.

Most importantly, California needs to institutionalize today's sense of urgency into policies that generate continuous improvements in how threats are assessed, how emergency response agencies are organized and managed, and how resources are defined and used in the name of public safety.

An immediate challenge will be to reconcile the growing list of needed improvements with anemic public coffers. The prudence of today's fiscal decisions, however, will be judged by the consequences of the next large disaster. A sustained effort to improve public safety will require a sustained allocation – perhaps even a dedicated revenue source – that allows public agencies to systematically bolster their ability to identify hazards, respond effectively, and minimize injuries and damage.

Some investments will be necessary to prepare California for events that may never occur, but would be so catastrophic that action is warranted. Other expenditures, if properly managed, could improve responses to more likely emergencies and everyday public services, especially improvements to health and information systems. Finally, some communities have led the way in enlisting the assistance of skilled Californians who are willing to be trained and ready to respond when their fellow Californians need them, expanding capacity at minimal additional costs.

Historically, California had critiqued its own experiences to fortify its ability to respond to the next disaster. The potential consequences are now so large that California must be more prospective in its approach. To help policy-makers initiate a process of steady progress, the Commission has identified four domains where improvements should begin.

First, all disasters are local, but all communities are not prepared for what now is possible. The State needs to ensure that communities are ready to respond to the unusual – and not just willing to help others respond to larger versions of everyday emergencies.


Second, the State must ensure that its structure – forged by experience in natural disasters – will be just as strong in the larger, more dynamic and uncertain dangers that terrorism inflicts.

Third, for those who have asked “what if,” the most sobering response has come from public health officials. They describe a neglected system that cannot be relied upon to detect or assess chemical or biological attacks, or treat the thousands or more who may need care. The State needs to fashion immediate and long-term improvements to public health assets.

And finally, public information systems need to be improved, to allow Californians to prepare and protect themselves, reducing injury and anxiety.

Assessing all of the efforts that are underway has been difficult in part because security concerns have draped a shroud of secrecy over some initiatives. The new normalcy may require the State to take such precautions, but scrutiny and oversight of government actions cannot be fully sacrificed. Public confidence in government is always earned – in this case by a thorough and, where possible, open review of issues. In this regard, we urge the Legislature to continue the dialogue created by the Speaker's Task Force on the Impact of Terrorism on California. Toward that end the Commission offers the recommendations in this report for your consideration.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Michael E. Alpert". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "M" and "A".

Michael E. Alpert
Chairman

Be Prepared:

*Getting Ready for New
and Uncertain Dangers*

January 2002

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
California’s Solid Foundation	2
Times Have Changed	4
Creatively Addressing Needs	5
In the Weeks Since the Events	5
Finding 1: All Disasters Are Local.....	7
Building a Baseline.....	9
Finding 2: The State’s Role	11
Beyond Coordination	17
Finding 3: Rebuilding Public Health	19
Restoring Public Health	23
Finding 4: The Public Engaged.....	25
Toward Accurate and Targeted Communications	27
Appendices & Notes	29
Appendix A - Little Hoover Commission Public Hearing Witnesses	31
Notes	33

Table of Sidebars

Redefining Preparedness	1
SSCOT Member Organizations	3
Using GIS for Homeland Security.....	13
Health Alert Networks	20
Assessing Needs	21
Volunteers Filling the Gap.....	23

Table of Charts & Graphs

Lead Agencies for Emergency Response	16
State Contributions to Local Health Departments for Disease Surveillance	19

Introduction

An essential question following the events of September 11th is whether California and her communities have taken prudent actions to prepare for similar kinds of attacks. Some of the necessary actions can thwart strikes, limit their damage or bolster the defenses of targets that may never have been as secure as officials would like. Those actions must necessarily be kept confidential to protect their effectiveness. But many issues concern the ability to respond to emergencies once they occur – and public review and scrutiny is the best way to ensure that agencies are meeting public expectations. Because of this tension between the need for some secrecy and the benefit of public oversight, the Commission focused on the State’s ability to respond to terrorist attacks, rather than efforts to prevent them.

Review of executive branch actions, whether public or otherwise, is a cornerstone of democratic governments. These checks and balances are a primary means for making government responsive to the needs of the public. And in the area of security, the vitality of this review will influence the degree of public trust in the actions that have been taken. Without an understanding of the weaknesses, voters and taxpayers may not understand – or even have a chance to support – additional public expenditure. And in large disasters – particular those that are acts of war – the actions of everyday citizens to protect themselves and to aid others may be as important as those of trained professionals.

The Commission initiated this review with a belief that the events of September 2001 – in the context of the security threats emerging in a global economy and a post-cold war world – fundamentally alter the role of state and local governments in the area of homeland defense.

Redefining Preparedness

Even for Californians who did not suffer personal loss, the terrorist attacks of this fall change the way we think about personal safety.

The images of the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the Pennsylvania crash sites have burned ghostly impressions into our psyches. The ubiquitous, insidious, silent and microscopic nature of the anthrax attacks diminish our sense of well-being in our own living rooms.

For policy-makers, the events – and the responses to them – raise several issues. As in previous wars, officials are challenged to balance civil liberties with public safety. State officials will be challenged to take on new roles related to defense that have historically rested primarily with the federal government. They will be challenged to balance the needs to prepare for attacks that are still remote with the ageless damage inflicted by poverty and disease.

Terrorism is not new, but we should never think about it the same again. If we learn one lesson from these events, it should be that local communities and state agencies need to dedicate some of their best minds to continuously improving our collective ability to respond to these increasingly diverse dangers.

We do not need to be motivated by fear, but by the knowledge that preparation diminishes harm. Toward that end, the Commission offers these suggestions for improving the readiness of all Californians, their communities and the state. Much more analysis will be needed to know what precisely needs to be done. These recommendations would provide for progress to be made with each new day.

Much of what the Commission heard during this abbreviated review supported the assertion that state and local officials must think differently. They must think differently about the resources that should be dedicated to emergency response and the expertise that must be engaged in preparing organizations and individuals. They also must think differently about time. Swift decisions, based on thorough preparation, can reduce the multiple potential consequences of a single act.

Disaster officials learned the hard way – but at least they learned – that information, coordination and leadership are essential to a rapid and effective response to any emergency. (These same fundamentals are key to the success of other public programs, but without a shared sense of urgency progress is often limited.) The overall challenge will be for state and local officials to build upon this foundation – by candidly addressing shortcomings, making difficult resource decisions, and engaging the public as partners in the quest to restore our confidence.

California’s Solid Foundation

In the days since the disasters, state officials have asserted that the Office of Emergency Services (OES) is “the most experienced, innovative and effective emergency management agency in the world today.”¹ The basis for that confidence is the State’s scrutiny of responses to previous disasters and its willingness to solve problems. One test of that claim will be how well OES and its growing list of partners learn from the terrorist attacks. California should take pride in being the best, but that does not mean the state is prepared for what could happen.

Learning from experience, California has developed three structures that have improved its response to floods, fires, earthquakes and civil unrest:

- The Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) establishes roles and responsibilities for local and state agencies. In times of emergency, SEMS provides for an integrated response involving whichever agencies and expertise is necessary. Local agencies must comply with the SEMS to receive state funding for emergency preparedness activities.
- The incident command structure allows responders from different agencies and neighboring communities to coordinate their efforts through a unified command and clear communications.
- Mutual aid agreements allow one community to draw resources from other communities, the state or federal governments until the needs are met. To improve this process, the State developed a Response

Information Management System that can quickly communicate resource needs and determine how those needs will be met.

These structures are scrutinized and improved after large disasters. A review of those critiques shows the structures are not perfect. The floods of 1997, for example, challenged the system's ability to manage multiple, small incidents, especially when the emergency involves local and state agencies that are not experienced with SEMS or the incident command structure. In other words, the system works best when the principals have used it before – something that is not assured if terrorists use chemical or biological weapons or attack public infrastructure.²

In a direct response to terrorist activities, the State crafted the Terrorism Response Plan as a supplement to the general emergency response procedures. It also created the State Strategic Committee on Terrorism (SSCOT) to advise OES. And it created the State Terrorism Threat Advisory Committee, a subset of SSCOT intended to provide real time assessments that can guide the actions of first responders, state departments, the Governor, other constitutional officers and legislative leaders.

State officials assert this framework – with the addition of the SSCOT – would be just as effective in responding to attacks as it has been in natural disasters. But local officials and independent experts said the existing structures – for all of their strengths – do not ensure that individual communities and the state overall will be able to respond to acts of war, and in particular weapons of mass destruction. For instance, an expert from RAND, who also has served as a consultant to the State, concluded, “no one is comfortable with where we are.” And local officials, who stress that they are on the front lines, were much more candid about the need to make improvements in terms of equipment, training and other preparations.

SSCOT Member Organizations

State Office of Emergency Services (chair)
 Calif. Fire Service Association Representatives
 Calif. Law Enforcement Association
 California National Guard
 Department of Food & Agriculture
 Department of Forestry & Fire Protection
 Department of General Services
 Department of Health Services
 Department of Information Technology
 Department of Justice
 Department of Transportation
 Department of Water Resources
 Emergency Medical Services Authority
 Environmental Protection Agency
 Federal Bureau of Investigation
 Federal Emergency Management Agency
 Highway Patrol
 Mutual Aid Regional Advisory Committee
 State Water Resources Control Board
 U.S. Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms
 U.S. Secret Service
 Utility Emergency Association

Times Have Changed

The terrorist attacks inflicted this fall challenge existing preparedness models in at least three ways:

- 1. *Scale of emergencies.*** Much of the current planning is premised on what has happened in the past, with emergency officials slowly ratcheting up capabilities to respond to benchmark disasters. But unlike fires, floods and earthquakes, terrorist attacks are designed to produce maximum levels of chaos, destruction and fear. Insurance industry officials report that the attacks of September 11th are of a magnitude two to three times more than experienced in prior natural disasters – and concede that their planning is based on what has occurred, not what reasonably can occur.³ Emergency planners assert that the incident command and mutual aid systems provide for more and more resources to be deployed until needs are met. And state officials said they are prepared for two simultaneous events. But the confidence in the current system is eroded by the possibility that terrorist attacks will be larger than previously experienced, aimed at multiple targets, and intended to thwart established response plans.
- 2. *Simultaneity of events.*** Natural disasters have allowed officials to neatly contain their activities into a three-stage time frame: preparation, response and recovery. The recent attacks demonstrated the chaos imposed when public agencies and the public must respond to an emergency while simultaneously recovering from another and preparing for a third. The uncertainty of terrorism alone increases demands on the system. For example, not knowing whether an attack is over could seriously undermine the willingness of local agencies to share resources under a mutual aid system that has proven to work well in discrete and isolated events.
- 3. *Multiplicity of threats.*** Different types of events pose unique management challenges. But the layering of multiple and different events impose more daunting challenges than emergency response systems have experienced. The challenges of responding to weapons of mass destruction that may involve chemicals, explosives and diseases impose considerable complexity on decision-makers.

These new dangers and dynamics help to identify a number of areas where preparation can be improved. Local communities must be prepared for more and different dangers. Even the smallest communities near earthquake faults are ready for temblors. But are they ready for smallpox?

Creatively Addressing Needs

With the economy sagging, public coffers are not in a position to finance extensive improvements to equipment and personnel. Policy-makers will need better analyses of which investments would make the biggest improvements first. And in the long-term, the State will need to think about how it finances those aspects of homeland defense that the federal government will not cover. Some officials also are thinking more creatively about how they define “resources,” recognizing that community members with needed expertise can be enlisted in times of emergency if they are properly trained and the systems are in place to put them to work.

Government has an enormous opportunity to engage the public, channeling both anxiety and pride into meaningful responses. Emergency officials experienced with discrete events have come to view citizens as either victims or spectators. But in ongoing attacks, members of the public are potential victims. And in large events, volunteers can be important resources. For the public to be an asset rather than a liability, everyone needs to be informed, some people need to be pre-designated, and others need to be trained.

There are several issues that need to be addressed before citizens can become responders: training, liability, compensation and others. But the Red Cross and others have shown that these issues can be resolved and as a result, “resources” have been efficiently increased.

In the Weeks Since the Events

Reflecting the wartime mentality, California, along with other states, has taken measures in response to the attacks. Some of the activities have been made public and others have not. Among the responses:

- ***SSCOT has met and made an assessment.*** To its credit, the State already had a framework for dealing with terrorism. The Governor, in Executive Order D-47-01, directed the State Strategic Committee on Terrorism to evaluate the potential threats; to review California’s readiness to prevent and respond to attacks; and, to establish recommendations for prevention and response. The recommendations were sent to the Governor in a confidential document on October 30, 2001.
- ***SSCOT is assessing the public health system.*** A new subcommittee of SSCOT will develop recommendations on the public health response to biological and chemical threats. The committee includes representatives from the University of California, medical and health care associations, public health organizations, law enforcement and state agencies.

- ***SSCOT is reviewing public information materials.*** The committee is reviewing and developing materials to inform the public on ways to prevent and respond to conventional, nuclear, biological, chemical, cyber and agricultural-related terrorist threats.
- ***Law enforcement information center has been created.*** The California Anti-Terrorism Information Center was created at the Department of Justice to help local, state and federal law enforcement officers report, analyze and share information about suspected terrorists and their actions. Historically, emergency managers have had difficulty getting information from the FBI, and the center is intended to solve this problem. Information will be compiled in a centralized database accessible to authorized state, local and federal law enforcement personnel. A 14-member Executive Advisory Board appointed by the Governor will guide the administration of the center.⁴
- ***Federally sponsored risk assessments were completed.*** Prior to September 11th, counties were completing a federally sponsored assessment that identified terrorist-related risks and vulnerabilities. Because it was a first-of-its-kind look at potential terrorist targets, the project was important. But as will be explained later in this report, the assessments need improvement.
- ***Security measures have been increased.*** The National Guard is augmenting security at airports and selected bridges. The Department of Fish and Game is assisting the Coast Guard with vessel inspections in San Francisco Bay and the Los Angeles/Long Beach Harbor. A “Safety Information and Referral Line” is providing the public with a source of information. The OES State Operations Center, three Regional Emergency Operations Centers, the Fire and Rescue Emergency Operations Center, the Law Enforcement Emergency Operations Center and the Joint Information Center are being staffed seven days a week. The California Highway Patrol has taken a number of steps to increase truck safety and to protect critical infrastructure.
- ***State liaison to federal government has been appointed.*** The Governor has appointed a special advisor on state security. He will advise the Governor on anti-terrorism efforts in California and coordinate with local, state, and federal authorities. He also will serve as a liaison with the federal Homeland Security Office.⁵ He will analyze whether California is prepared for a major attack, and is working on ways to better inform the public of threats.⁶

All Disasters Are Local

Finding 1: California has not verified the ability of local agencies to respond adequately to multiple, large-scale disasters – particularly attacks engineered to cause massive casualties, destruction and chaos.

Because disasters take many forms and have different levels of magnitude, California has created the Standardized Emergency Management System. SEMS provides common management and operational protocols for emergency response agencies statewide. The incident command structure can be scaled for use in small emergencies involving a single agency or in large disasters involving multiple agencies. These protocols allow agencies with specialized responsibilities to coordinate their actions under stressful and dangerous conditions.

SEMS also provides protocols for disaster planning, communication among emergency agencies, and use of resources and accounting. The Governor's Office of Emergency Services is responsible for ensuring that SEMS is updated to incorporate lessons learned in drills and actual disasters.

While SEMS is praised for having improved the State's ability to respond to emergencies, there are weaknesses in the way California prepares for emergencies. Among them:

Some counties are more ready than others.

Communities that have been hit hard by disasters are often willing to invest more resources in being prepared. San Francisco – hardened by earthquakes, storms and other events – has recruited and trained Neighborhood Emergency Response Teams (NERTs) to help provide immediate disaster assistance. In a major disaster these teams are intended to provide crucial emergency services and minimize casualties for up to 72 hours or until outside assistance arrives. San Francisco has enlisted 11,000 NERT volunteers.⁷

Other communities have access to better technology or expertise, allowing them to undertake more sophisticated programs. The Los Angeles County Sheriff's office, which previously developed a Terrorism Early Warning Group, is expanding training for first responders and efforts to coordinate interdiction activities among law enforcement agencies within the region.

These counties recognize that first responders will always be local – and that even the best mutual aid system will take time to deliver assistance. A federal response to bioterrorism, for instance, will be strong, but not

immediate. Local agencies need to be capable of sustaining their own response for at least 12 to 24 hours.⁸

Emergency response officials reported they were as well prepared as they could be. But none felt they were as well prepared as they should be and the actual level of preparedness varies from county to county.

Regardless of where individuals live, they should be ensured a baseline level of protection. In addition to the most parochial concerns, this inconsistency among local agencies weakens the ability of neighboring communities to rely on a mutual aid system when large disasters strike.

There is no way of knowing who is really ready.

Responsibility is dispersed among many governmental and non-governmental agencies. While the incident command structure provides a means for coordinating those efforts during an emergency, ensuring that every agency is prepared to respond is a different story. The director of emergency preparedness for the city of San Jose testified that California has scaled back efforts to ensure preparedness among all of the players: “We used to have state requirements ... have a plan, full-scale exercises every four years and a functional exercise each year. And those requirements have been taken away. I know communities that have not had their emergency plans open in the last five years.”

There is no baseline level of readiness.

The strength of the SEMS is the ability to draw resources and tailor emergency responses to the requirements of individual disasters. While the system eventually brings to bear whatever resources are necessary, the director of OES acknowledged that the State’s capacity was limited to responding to two major disasters at a time. The director of OES knows this because the state has had to respond to two emergencies simultaneously; this is not a deliberate level of readiness based on an assessment of what is possible or even likely.

As a result of these factors, the system may not function as well in response to a terrorist event as it does to a discrete natural disaster. Terrorist events may require a larger and more sustained response than local agencies are prepared for. Terrorist events may require more and different skills and equipment than natural disasters.

The San Jose official warned that mutual aid agreements may not be as effective in covering for the weaknesses in one jurisdiction with the strengths in a neighboring one. For starters, terrorist events may undermine the willingness of communities to share their resources with their neighbors.

“Mutual aid requires other agencies to release people — something they may not be willing to do after a terrorist attack.”

Building a Baseline

Within the last year, counties in California have conducted an assessment of needs and vulnerabilities associated with terrorist acts. The assessments were orchestrated by the federal Office of Justice Programs (OJP) within the U.S. Department of Justice. The Commission interviewed county officials responsible for the assessments in five populous counties. Most officials found limited value in the exercise.⁹ They described the process as tedious, confusing, time-consuming and costly. All said that their disaster plans would not change as a result of the assessments because the plans are generic and created to respond to all hazards. They also were already aware of most potential targets and vulnerabilities in their community. Nevertheless, they completed the process because they believed it would influence federal spending to bolster local capacity.

Similarly, officials with both OES and the federal OJP reported that the assessments could have been better. The level of effort and the information gathered through the process was inconsistent from county to county.¹⁰ Some communities may have withheld information because of concerns about the level of confidentiality, an issue described later in this report. A statewide assessment has not been prepared; SSCOT may be given the task.

For all of the shortcomings of the just-completed assessments, there is broad support for routine and rigorous assessments of vulnerabilities and risks. These assessments can improve preparations by making sure locals are aware of the latest threats, by determining training needs and guiding the allocation of resources. The director of OES estimated that a continuous assessment process would cost the State about \$1.5 million annually and require authority his agency does not have.

The assessments also could help to develop minimum standards – for equipment, training and personnel – that would provide a baseline of readiness for communities. The standards could take into consideration the size of the communities and the nature of the assets.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency, for example, has created some benchmarks for preparedness – including one professional emergency manager for each 100,000 people.¹¹

Similarly, the state Emergency Medical Service Agency is developing standards to guide local EMS agencies. An official with the agency said

California may be the only state in the nation to produce a set of medical disaster standards and assessment tools that clearly define the planning, response and recovery responsibilities of local EMS agencies.¹²

Are the locals ready? The locals certainly do not think so. In the wake of the attacks, large cities found money in tight budgets to beef up public health staffs, improve communication technologies and expand laboratory capacity. Local officials also presented “wish lists” to state and federal policy-makers. Policy-makers will have to determine how and how much to help the local agencies. Without some kind of guidelines or standards, policy-makers at the local, state or federal level will not be able to measure readiness or make wise long-term investments.

Recommendation 1: California should fortify local disaster preparations by requiring risk and vulnerability assessments, adopting standards for readiness and creating effective mechanisms for verifying that standards are met. Specific elements should include:

- ❑ ***Rigorous and periodic assessments.*** Instruments should measure vulnerabilities and risk. They should identify how best to respond to specific threats. And they should identify resource needs and guide the allocation of local, state and federal funds.
- ❑ ***Minimum standards.*** The standards should be a baseline for readiness, guiding investments in equipment, training and personnel, and other attributes and assets. Standards should include drills and other ways to verify if local officials are prepared to employ the resources and systems that are developed.
- ❑ ***Measurement and reporting.*** State and local policy-makers should know on a community-by-community basis which standards are being met, which are not and what actions are necessary to meet those standards.
- ❑ ***Assessing and replicating innovations.*** The State can best employ its leadership role by analyzing and, where warranted, spreading local innovations. The Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group, a flexible structure for sharing information among all organizations responding to attacks, may be one such innovation.

The State's Role

Finding 2: The State has not identified what will be necessary -- or developed a plan to ensure -- that California is prepared for the types of emergencies it may face.

Good disaster preparedness is built from the ground up. The strength of the SEMS is that it requires local agencies to plug into the mutual aid and incident command structure. And the State has pursued the goal of protecting life and property by developing this largely cooperative system.

The terror attacks of 2001, however, show that the State may need to play a more direct role in making sure that all of the necessary disciplines are prepared and that potential disasters unique to specific communities are covered. In the first finding, the Commission asserted this bottom-up approach would be stronger if communities had to demonstrate the capacity to perform in an emergency and not just the willingness to share resources. But the attacks -- and the dynamics they portend -- reveal other potential changes the State should consider.

Governance needs to be clarified.

The incident command structure embedded in SEMS may be one of the best models in state government for integrating the actions of different agencies. But it might not be enough.

As described previously, terrorist attacks may require responses from agencies that have not traditionally been involved in emergencies. (Even typical disasters, such as the floods of 1997, have demonstrated that many public agencies are not prepared to operate under SEMS.) The criminal aspects of terrorist attacks complicate the civil nature of most emergency responses. And the federal role in terrorist attacks complicates California's reliance on local agencies to help themselves and each other.

State officials maintain that California is not as big as the federal government and so does not need an office of homeland security. At the same time, two different public officials pointed to different individuals when asked who was "California's Tom Ridge."

The Terrorism Annex to the State Emergency Plan created the State Strategic Committee on Terrorism and the associated Terrorism Threat Advisory Committee to advise the Governor on terrorist-related actions. The organizations are structured to coordinate state activities with federal and local agencies. And the director of OES chairs both groups. But in response to September 11, the Governor appointed a special advisor to be a liaison to the federal government and advise him on terrorist activities.

Appropriately, state law has identified specific authorities necessary for swift and certain action in an emergency, and vested those with the Governor. But the reality is that individuals within the large bureaucracy must also make subject-specific decisions that must be coordinated with others – and the current structure does not make it clear that the right people are in the right places.

State government may not be as big as the federal government, but California is large and diverse. Emergencies are locally based, where much of that diversity takes form. And the nature of terrorist attacks will likely involve public agencies that do not play central roles in natural disasters.

Several other states – including Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, South Carolina and Tennessee – have created a cabinet position for homeland security.

As the crisis passes, California should reconsider whether the terrorism-related structure, which is not based in statute, should be clarified, strengthened or formalized. Lessons learned during recent events could be used to refine the structure, including the role of a special advisor to the Governor.

Communication among public agencies needs to be improved.

California officials have demonstrated an understanding of this issue by creating the law enforcement information center at the Department of Justice. But the State has not systematically assessed what information it has, what information will be needed, and how that information will be communicated to everyone who will depend on it.

In some cases, the State needs to make sure it is putting available information to the best use. Environmental laws, for instance, have required the creation of inventories of hazardous materials that are released, stored or transported. But some of those materials are regulated by federal agencies and some by state agencies, including the departments of Agriculture, Toxic Substances Control, and Health and Human Services. While this information is used for regulatory purposes, or intended to raise public awareness, it is not organized or used to reduce the dangers associated with terrorism.

In other cases the missing ingredient is the information itself. Government has not inventoried all facilities – such as private biotechnology labs – that have materials that could be used as weapons of mass destruction, could cause significant economic harm or widespread panic.

And in still other cases, the problem will be communicating information to professionals who will need it. Health officials and doctors are spread throughout various public and private facilities and there are no established means to communicate details to them on threats, attacks or responses. The State has not systematically assessed the security of these facilities, including who has access to potentially dangerous materials. The State has not determined whether standards are necessary to ensure public safety.

Geographic Information Systems can provide accurate and accessible information to responders about what is where. In the 1980s, the State began to invest in GIS, but this technology has not been fully integrated into efforts to prepare for, or respond to, emergencies.

Fiscal analysis needs to be improved.

Government is always challenged by how much and how to spend its resources. The terrorist attacks complicated this task by adding to the demands on resources the need to spend more on still remote but potentially catastrophic events. Policy-makers need a process for better analyzing and comparing how and where dollars need to be spent so that inevitable tradeoffs can be as informed as possible.

According to data collected by OES for a national study in 2000, the State spent \$44.3 million on disaster preparedness, in addition to the \$400 million spent by the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection in federal fiscal year 1999. It took several months for OES to gather the information from all of the agencies involved in disaster preparedness and several agencies could only provide an estimate of their related expenditures.

Other witnesses testified that funds previously dedicated to emergency response are being spent by locals on other programs. The State can improve how it tracks current expenditures and determines future ones. RAND and others have advised the state to develop analytical tools that consider the chances that an event will occur with the consequences if that event did occur.

Using GIS for Homeland Security

Geographic Information Systems (GIS) provide many opportunities to enhance public safety. It can be used to map out potential targets within the state or to guide emergency vehicles along the shortest route to the site of an attack. The Mayor's Office of Emergency Management in New York City has an Interactive Map for Emergency Information (IMEI) that provides current information on the World Trade Center, including car and pedestrian restrictions, utility outages, etc., in and around "Ground Zero."

GIS can be used to:

- Assess risks to communities and infrastructure.
- Establish specific mitigation and protection plans.
- Determine the scale of an emergency.
- Estimate the rate of spread or progression.
- Identify and evacuate at-risk populations.
- Expedite and direct rescue efforts.
- Provide accurate damage assessments.
- Prioritize recovery efforts.

In response to September 11, federal agencies have initiated the Geospatial Assurance (GA) program "to identify, acquire, integrate and share geographic data to meet both civilian and military homeland security requirements." In California, the GIS Council is working with GA to prioritize, gather and integrate the needed data sets. A Homeland Security Subcommittee was created within the Council to coordinate a response to the GA program.

Sources: <http://www.gis.ca.gov/council/> and <http://www.esri.com/industries/homelandsecurity/>

In addition, several analysts recommended giving greater consideration to improvements that would better prepare a community for terrorist attacks, while increasing its capacity to respond to more likely threats to public health and safety. The Highway Patrol's comprehensive truck inspections, for instance, could improve safety on the highways, in addition to thwarting a crime. Similarly, public agencies should be alert to spin-off benefits, whether in technology or procedures, that could improve everyday public services. Can advances in identification technology, for instance, be used to reduce fraud or improve services to the poor?

Some states have created a dedicated revenue stream to pay for preparedness efforts. Florida in 1993 created a trust fund financed by a surcharge on commercial and domestic property insurance. The money is used for emergency management efforts, mostly at the local level. Local agencies have used the money to improve communications systems, retrofit emergency shelters and train medical assistance teams. The state has used the funds to build a geographic information system and a satellite communications system. Other states have created, or are considering similar funds, to pay for disaster-related preparation.

Given its larger role in homeland defense, the State should consider sources of revenue that could be used to fortify the emergency response system. Policy-makers should consider a range of alternatives, including additional sales tax or a levy on property insurance policies. Another alternative would be to tap property tax revenues, which might require amending Proposition 13.

Public decisions need to be publicly reviewed.

A fundamental principle of democratic governments is that openness improves the quality of decision-making. By vetting concerns, experts can comment on options and the public can make their desires known. Public review also is how democracies ensure that policies are being implemented as intended.

Preparing for malicious attacks may require that some concerns not be publicly discussed. As is the case in virtually every other public policy, the bias in the area of security should be toward public disclosure. And, when something must be kept confidential, the State should develop a mechanism for effective and secure review by the Legislature to improve the chances that government actions are effective, efficient and responsive to the needs of the people. Public policies are virtually always strengthened by thoughtful review; when that review cannot be public, a rigorous surrogate is essential.

A RAND expert testified that states have not had to think about security issues in the same way as federal agencies. They do not have policies to

determine what should be classified, how to treat classified information, or for screening employees who have access to protected information.

In that regard, federal policy can be a guide to California. The federal Freedom of Information Act – the federal equivalent of California's Public Records Act – exempts classified information from disclosure. Presidential Executive Order 12958 provides detailed standards for what can be classified and classification levels (confidential, secret and top secret). It sets forth who can determine that information is classified, how agencies should treat classified information, who has access to classified information, how classified information becomes declassified, and sanctions for violating the order. It also provides for an Office of Information Security Oversight within the Office of Management and Budget to administer the order. It creates an appeals panel of high-ranking officials to review contested decisions. And it provides for an advisory council of non-government employees to advise on related issues.


Absent formal policy, state and local agencies have grappled – even prior to September 11 – with how to manage information they believed should be confidential. The director of OES testified that the risk assessments conducted by counties were being filed directly with the federal government to avoid the information becoming a public record under California law. Sensitive information would be stripped from the documents, the director said, before they were sent back to California for use by OES. At the same time, government employees of similar positions reported that they have been given different levels of access to documents and discussions that have occurred this fall. And in virtually every case, access was provided by virtue of their employment rather than any security clearance or background check.

Small communities need help with big targets.

Communities have disproportionate vulnerabilities to certain kinds of disasters. The State already recognizes that local communities many times do not have the resources to protect assets of statewide or regional importance. For example, the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection fights fires in rural areas that do not have that capacity. Likewise the California Highway Patrol has teamed up with local law enforcement agencies to protect water and power systems.

Rigorous local assessments will likely identify less obvious assets, such as university laboratories. Where local assets exceed the ability of locals to respond to an emergency, the State may need to take on additional responsibilities.

Lead Agencies for Emergency Response State Emergency Plan – Terrorism Annex



*In the Terrorism Annex, the Department of Food and Agriculture is listed as the lead agency for food safety with regard to meat and dairy production. The Department of Health Services is listed as the lead agency for food safety with regard to food manufacturers and wholesalers. Both agencies share the lead for food safety with regard to crop production.

Beyond Coordination

In the quest for safety following the attacks, California has received positive attention for many of its efforts to bolster emergency preparedness. The State has wisely recognized that the most important activity it can undertake is to coordinate the efforts and assets of local agencies. But terrorism has raised the bar and the State must rethink its role in preparing California for potential threats.

Recommendation 2: The State should fortify its structure for governing emergencies, for further improving communications and for ensuring that security and preparedness policies are responsive to public needs and effectively implemented.

- ❑ ***Clarify governance.*** The State should formalize the SSCOT in statute and clarify the roles of the director of OES, the Governor's security advisor, the Adjutant General of the National Guard and the Commissioner of the Highway Patrol.
- ❑ ***Establish priorities.*** State and local officials have apparently discussed in closed meetings the need for additional equipment, personnel and training. The federal government is expected to contribute to the cause. The State should develop an analytical tool and an integrated process for setting priorities. Special consideration should be given to expenditures that will improve public safety against more common threats or otherwise improve public services.
- ❑ ***Improve information collection.*** The SSCOT should do a comprehensive review of information that would improve California's understanding of its vulnerabilities, improve its ability to detect terrorist activities, and to respond to emergencies. This could include the use of Geographic Information Systems and other computer-based inventories. And where necessary, security standards should be established for private and public facilities that contain potentially dangerous materials.
- ❑ ***Improve Communications.*** Responding to future emergencies will likely require more and different professionals to be involved, increasing the need to communicate effectively. A comprehensive assessment should be done to determine who will need to be informed and how technology can provide real-time information to those in the field.
- ❑ ***Establish policies for confidential information.*** With a bias toward public disclosure but guided by the goal of public safety, policy-makers should develop policies for identifying and dealing with security-related information.
- ❑ ***State involvement in large targets.*** The State should assist local agencies in protecting – and responding to attacks on – infrastructure and other targets that are of regional or statewide importance.

Rebuilding Public Health

Finding 3: The State has not adequately maintained its public health assets to meet the needs of a growing population.

Perhaps the largest single weakness revealed by the terrorist attacks is the public health system. In some respects the demands on the public health system have been diminished by progress made to prevent disease and injury. To the extent that buildings and communities have been well designed and built, significant natural disasters have not inflicted the injuries and deaths that similar incidents do elsewhere. And the injuries have been the types of trauma that hospitals experience every day.

The attacks demonstrate that the numbers of injured could be much larger. And the anthrax letters revealed that detecting and responding to silent threats of some weapons of mass destruction is simply not something communities are adequately prepared to do.

What was once a robust commitment to public health monitoring, early detection and containment of diseases has largely been supplanted by reliance on health maintenance organizations and insurance-based health care. Preventive vaccines have eradicated or significantly diminished many diseases that once inflicted thousands, even millions of people.

But experts warn that terrorists have access to biological, chemical and nuclear weapons that could result in massive casualties. Medical experts warn that modern antibiotics and vaccines do not supplant the need for a strong public health system.

Local health departments receive far less state money today for disease surveillance than they did 50 years ago, especially after accounting for inflation.¹³ County health administrators estimate a one-time need of at least \$70 million dollars, and on-going costs of more than \$50 million annually to bolster the preparedness of the county public health departments.¹⁴

State Contributions to Local Health Departments for Disease Surveillance

Fiscal Year	Allocation for Disease Surveillance
1947-48	\$3 million: adjusted to 2001 dollars = \$23,986,500
2001-02	\$1 million: adjusted to 1947 dollars = \$135,200

Source: *Deadly Diseases: Surveillance required but underfunded*. Sacramento Bee. November 25, 2001.

State officials have taken action to strengthen health programs. In December, the Governor announced plans to provide \$5 million to local health departments for expanded disease surveillance. But the California Conference of Local Health Officers reports that this one-time allocation is not nearly enough to shore up long-neglected public health programs.¹⁵

Detection capability is inadequate.

Particularly in response to biological weapons, early detection is essential to minimizing harm and maximizing the effectiveness of any planned response. Many county and university medical experts have voiced concern about their ability to effectively assess visible threats – such as white powders that might be anthrax – as well as the invisible ones, such as smallpox. It is difficult, however, to determine just how under-prepared California is because state health officials appear to contradict the local officials who face the actual challenge. The Commission asked the Department of Health Services to provide additional information on the State’s laboratory capacity; that information will be forwarded to Assembly and Senate Health Committees when it is submitted to the Commission.

While local officials are seeking to bolster laboratory capacity, state officials assert that laboratory capacity is not an essential issue. While local officials seek comprehensive information on the threats and how they should respond, state officials downplay the need for such communication. While state officials assert that the public health system has been fully integrated

Health Alert Networks

As part of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) Health Alert Network (HAN) program, state and local governments are creating their own health alert networks. HAN is a nationwide, integrated information and communications system serving as a platform for the distribution of health alerts, dissemination of prevention guidelines and other information, distance learning, national disease surveillance, and electronic laboratory reporting, and for CDC’s bioterrorism and other initiatives to strengthen state and local preparedness. The CDC has provided funding to state and local governments to develop their own HAN systems.

The California Department of Health Services (CHDS) has constructed a system called the Rapid Health Electronic Alert Communication and Training System (RHEACTS). In the event of an outbreak, alerts will be sent via e-mail, phone, cell phone and pager. Currently the system is set up to contact public health officers, lab directors, bioterrorism coordinators, communicable disease directors and environmental directors. This can be expanded later to include any number of participants such as emergency room directors and general practitioners.

San Diego’s system is called the Emergency Medical Alert Network (EMAN). It uses an e-mail Listserv to contact its 500 members. They are currently seeking funding to send alerts via cell phones and pagers. Los Angeles also created its Health Alert System Training and Education Network (HASTEN) with the use of CDC funds.

Sources: <http://www.phppo.cdc.gov/han/>, <http://www.emansandiego.com> and http://labt.org/about_bioterrorism.asp. Interviews with staff at EMAN and with Bob Hall from CDHS.

into the traditional emergency response system, the protocols for reporting incidents require local officials to make separate phone calls to OES and the Department of Health Services.¹⁶

Facilities are inadequate.

While California hospitals have had extensive experience treating earthquake, flood and fire victims, terrorist attacks would place large demands on hospitals.¹⁷ According to the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Bio-defense Studies, "no hospital or group of local hospitals in the United States could effectively manage even 500 patients demanding sophisticated medical care such as would be required in an outbreak of anthrax. In the event of a contagious disease outbreak, such as smallpox, fewer patients could be handled. There are not enough beds, supplies or drugs to cope with a sudden significant surge in patient demand."¹⁸

Historically, the State maintained portable hospitals that could supplement permanent facilities or be used to establish quarantine areas. But the State gave up these units in the mid-1990s. The California Healthcare Association, which represents hospitals, recommends that these units be replaced with modern portable hospital units.¹⁹ In previous years, the Emergency Medical Services Authority (EMSA) proposed replacing those units, as well.

Experts agree that California's medical systems run at or near capacity under normal conditions and hospitals are not prepared to handle a sudden surge of patients. There may be other options in some communities, including closed hospitals, hotels and other facilities that with some preparation could be used during an emergency.

The hospital industry has not "field tested" its ability to respond to bioterrorism, but administrators estimate that it would cost \$1 billion to prepare facilities to handle patients in the first 24 hours following an attack.

Staff is not ready.

Public health workers, health professionals who work with patients daily and health professionals who are retired or are no longer in practice can all be important resources in the event of a disaster. But most do not have the training necessary.

Assessing Needs

Officials at UCLA have developed a risk assessment instrument that can help local agencies determine their ability to respond to a public health emergency.

The tool considers which emergencies are most likely to occur, the existing health care infrastructure, and then identifies additional resources that might be necessary. Each potential incident may require a different set of resources and responses. The model has been used in Santa Barbara County and elsewhere.

This model may be useful for other counties, and the state overall.

- In a survey conducted by the National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO), 95 percent of local public health agency directors indicated that appropriate members of their staff had not received bioterrorism training.²⁰
- Among health workers in general, 80 percent lack formal training in public health according to the director of the UCLA Center for Public Health and Disaster.²¹
- A representative of the California Medical Association (CMA) said that county public health departments are "all but invisible to most practicing physicians and other health care workers."²²

These experts recommended that health workers be trained in disaster response protocols that would enable these professionals to be put to work quickly and effectively in a large disaster. The CMA recommends that doctors be trained to respond to patients who report that they may have been exposed to bioterrorism. Nurses experienced in emergency response recommended that the State certify nurses in emergency medical procedures. They reported that with additional training many retired nurses could be deployed in emergencies.

Outside the immediate network of emergency personnel, a larger pool of doctors, nurses and technicians are the first to treat the sick and injured. But they are not incorporated into the system for detecting problems, or in the larger response network. They suggest that the State develop a database of medical personnel and their skills that would allow disaster officials to quickly contact and assign professionals. These professionals could be enlisted on a voluntary basis to receive disaster-specific training and agree to respond in the event of an emergency. Because they are licensed, disaster service could be defined as a professional obligation if inadequate numbers agree to serve.

Physicians want access to emergency medical experts who can provide them with detailed treatment information at all times. Many physicians polled by CMA reported they do not know who their local public health officer is or how to get in touch with them in an emergency. Nurses, veterinarians and others with specialized skills need to know who to contact when disaster strikes and how they can help in response and recovery operations. The director of a volunteer coordination agency said that volunteers must be screened and trained in disaster protocols prior to an emergency if communities want to take full advantage of their expertise and abilities.

One common element in all of these suggestions is the need for good information and communication: Who can help? What do they need to

know? How can they be informed? Reliable channels of communication have not been established. The director of the State Department of Health Services said she would rely upon television stations to disseminate public health and disaster information to medical professionals. But representatives from the broadcast industry said news organizations are the wrong means for communicating detailed information to a select group of people.

Restoring Public Health

The Governor has announced the creation of a registry of doctors, nurses and other experts who can provide information on infectious diseases, biological hazards, poisons and radiation dangers. But more needs to be done. Californians with medical expertise need to be trained to respond, and systems need to be in place to provide them with essential event-related information and assign them to where they are needed.

The Governor has created a subcommittee of the SSCOT to review the public health system's ability to detect and respond to terrorist threats. That review may be able to provide additional details on improving the ability of local health agencies to protect their communities.

Volunteers Filling the Gap

Public coffers may never be deep enough to pay for every precaution. But the experience of New York and other cities reveals that many citizens are willing to volunteer their skills in times of emergency. Moreover, people will volunteer whether they are prepared or not. With preparation, these volunteers can be assets rather than liabilities. Among the ideas that should be considered:

- Create a registry of professionals who can be called upon in the event of a major disaster. Professional medical personnel who are not pre-trained or pre-screened before an event occurs can end up making sandwiches or handing out coffee. A registry would address this problem. The registry also could include retired professionals and those who have left the medical profession. The Governor has called for the creation of a registry of experts that can be contacted for advice.
- Issue identification cards to those who are members of the registry. This will allow them to be screened more quickly and directed to where their skills are needed.
- Expand Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs). DMATs are volunteer groups of professional and paraprofessional medical personnel who provide emergency medical care during a disaster. Currently there are six teams in California.
- Build upon the 41 volunteer centers in California that currently recruit and refer volunteers.
- Create citizen emergency teams using the existing Neighborhood Watch structure. President Bush has created a Task Force on Citizen Preparedness in the War on Terrorism to recommend how the public can prepare and volunteer to assist in the event of a terrorist attack.
- Promulgate the use of Neighborhood Emergency Response Teams (NERT).
- Expand the role of the Red Cross to include referral of volunteers to other organizations. Red Cross is dedicated to first response and not equipped to refer volunteers.
- Set up a dedicated volunteer phone line with automated information on where volunteers are needed and skills that are in demand. In New York City 100,000 volunteers overwhelmed phone lines meant for those in need of help.

Source: Nora Silver, Founder and Director of the Volunteerism Project. Testimony to the Commission. November 15, 2001.

Recommendation 3: The State should measure the adequacy of emergency medical response capacity in all communities and ensure appropriate resources are dedicated to creating and maintaining adequate public health services. Among the components:

- ❑ **Physical capacity.** The State should ensure that additional hospital capacity is available to support existing medical facilities during a large disaster or to help quarantine exposed populations. The additional capacity may be portable field hospitals or permanent structures that can serve on a standby basis.
- ❑ **Diagnostic capability.** The State needs to expand the ability to detect smallpox, anthrax, etc. While this capacity does not need to be replicated in every community, the large number of false alarms that occur during even a suspected attack requires that threats be assessed as locally and as quickly as possible.
- ❑ **Trained medical personnel.** The State should develop programs to raise awareness of disaster response protocols throughout the medical community. These programs should be tailored to capture the full potential of California's medical workforce to offer and include appropriately designed training programs so that medical professionals can be put to work to assist in an emergency.
- ❑ **Create inventories.** The State should create an automated database of medical personnel information that allows emergency officials to identify, contact and deploy medical personnel where they can provide the highest quality of medical assistance to disaster victims. Those professionals could be enlisted on a voluntary, or if necessary, on an obligatory basis to assist their communities.

The Public Engaged

Finding 4: The State should improve the content and the means for distributing information to the public at the time of civil emergencies.

Within the Standardized Emergency Management System, the State has created sophisticated mechanisms for alerting public agencies about disasters and coordinating their response. But less attention has been given to developing the means for informing organizations and individuals outside of the typical emergency chain of command.

A former presidential press secretary cautioned that public confidence – particularly in times of crisis – is predicated on the distribution of complete and accurate information: “The biggest difference in terrorism is the population doesn’t know what to do or the consequences. Information breeds confidence, silence breeds fear.”²³

Consider the elements of responding to bioterrorism, as described by one expert: “1) A mass prophylaxis campaign to assure that those at risk are provided necessary vaccinations or pharmaceuticals. 2) A mass treatment capability of those who become symptomatic. 3) A system for managing potentially large numbers of casualties and, 4) a system for assuring that the environment does not continue to present a risk for the population after an attack has occurred.”²⁴

The success of each of these pieces would require significant and coordinated actions by individual members of the general public – and they could only succeed if adequate public information is provided.

Another expert concluded that in the event of a biological or chemical weapon (BCW) attack public information is as important as the medical response itself: “The difference between a relatively confined and limited incident (to which all but the most extreme cases of BCW attacks can be reduced) and chaos lies, to a large extent, upon carefully developed and well-rehearsed decision-making processes, coupled with an elaborate and well-coordinated public affairs campaign.”²⁵

In assessing this issue, policy-makers need to consider both the mechanisms for communicating, as well as the information that will be communicated.

Mechanisms are inadequate.

The State has an emergency alert system, which is part of the national emergency alert system mandated under federal law. Federal regulations require licensed broadcasters to disseminate emergency alerts issued by

designated governmental officials. But the chairman of the broadcasters committee that oversees the system said it is limited to alerting people to danger and does not inform people about how to prepare or even respond to disasters. A representative from the state broadcasters association said members are committed to providing as much information about disasters as the public wants and needs, but broadcasters rely on government officials to provide them with accurate, timely and useful information to report. Moreover, relying on private media requires the government to relinquish considerable control over what information is actually distributed.

The advances of cable television and the Internet change the dynamics by providing the government direct access to the public. The expansion of media sources also increases the chances that at least some private media will distribute more complete versions of public-provided information.

Similarly, local communities once had civil defense alert systems. Some of them were as rudimentary as sirens, but they could at least alert the public to imminent danger. The emergency services director of the City of San Jose said that federal funding for such systems was reduced during the 1980s, and with the threat of nuclear war reduced, many communities have abandoned the systems. “Now we drive through neighborhoods with public address systems,” she said.

The chairman of a federal taskforce that studied emergency communications said it is potentially dangerous to rely on the media to inform the public in emergencies. The public disregards much of the information it receives from the media, he warned, and mass media are largely one-way communications intended to deliver only general information. Two-way communication is often required between those with the information and those who need to take action. And, some individuals will need more as well as different information than others.

Information is inadequate.

The experience of the last few months provides numerous examples of when the public was misinformed about issues that were important to their health, even survival.

As the anthrax attack evolved, the public was given conflicting information from the highest sources in government about the dangers, the pathways, the symptoms and the types of treatment available. Officials may have provided them with the best information available at the time, but the confidence in the government was eroded and many citizens concluded that information was being withheld.

The public wants to help, but they do not know how. A video prepared by the California Highway Patrol intended to instruct state workers about handling mail has been widely broadcast because of the almost insatiable demand for information on anthrax. Similarly, the public has been frequently asked to be vigilant and alert, but given little information as to what that means.

State, federal and local officials have grappled with ways to inform the public about threats in ways that make it possible for individuals to act prudently to protect themselves, their families or their property. The proposal to develop a tiered warning system is a thoughtful response to the criticism that resulted from some of the general warnings issued.

Toward Accurate and Targeted Communications

Technology provides numerous options to public officials that did not exist even a decade ago. The Working Group on Natural Disasters has comprehensively documented how cellular telephones, pagers, the Internet and other applications of microchip technology can be used to inform virtually everyone in a limited area to specific dangers, or more broadly distribute information to guide public actions.

A first step might be to upgrade the existing emergency alert system with the latest digital and satellite technology. Part of the State's emergency alert system has been updated with this technology, but not on a statewide basis. Some areas still rely on officials contacting specific broadcasters by phone to relay emergency messages. Digital systems allow officials to send messages electronically, even by satellite, to all broadcast outlets. This is particularly important as more radio and television stations become fully automated. Under the current system, automated stations may not have staff available to broadcast alerts.

Some good advice came from the former chairman of the federal working group, who warned that lots of money could be wasted on the wrong answers if policy-makers do not work through critical issues first. Most warnings are currently issued by federal, state and local government authorities, but most current or potential warning delivery systems are owned and operated by the private industry. He recommended establishing a public-private partnership involving public agencies and media organizations to ensure that the full range of communication options are used to inform individuals. A partnership was created at the national level in November.

In addition to developing the means of distributing information, the State needs to make sure complete and accurate information is shared with the public. This may require developing information that can help the public

prepare for attacks – just as we have planned for natural disasters. It also could mean developing information for distribution during an attack, particularly those involving biological and chemical warfare when the public will need information to determine if they are a victim or how to avoid becoming a victim. It might also involve procedures for quickly developing – and providing expert review – of incident-specific information.

Recommendation 4: California should explore ways to use modern technology – coupled with information protocols – to completely and accurately inform the public about potential threats and the actions they should take. These efforts should include:

- ❑ ***A new emergency information system.*** California should develop a public-private partnership for exploring how to best use communication technology to reach all Californians and selected populations. The partnership should set priorities and identify ways to finance the information system.
- ❑ ***Public education.*** Using the Internet and other media, the State should develop comprehensive information on the hazards that Californians face, including weapons of mass destruction that may be used by terrorists, and the actions they can take to protect themselves.
- ❑ ***Information protocols.*** California should develop information that will be distributed at times of emergencies, including information on how people should reduce their vulnerability, or other specific actions they should take. The State also should develop protocols that allow new information to be developed, reviewed by experts and distributed in ways that will best inform the public.

Appendices & Notes

✓ *Public Hearing Witnesses*

✓ *Notes*

Appendix A

Little Hoover Commission Public Hearing Witnesses

***Witnesses Appearing at Little Hoover Commission
Disaster Preparedness Hearing on October 25, 2001***

Michael Amado, Director
American Red Cross
San Gabriel Valley Chapter

Jerry Davies
Director of Communications
Personal Insurance Federation

Frances Edwards-Winslow
Director of Emergency Preparedness
City of San Jose

Michael Grossman, Captain
Sheriff's Department
County of Los Angeles

Dallas Jones, Director
Governor's Office of Emergency Services

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General
Department of Justice

Jim McColm, Chapter Manager
American Red Cross
Greater Los Angeles Chapter

Jack Riley, Director
RAND Criminal Justice

Steven Rottman, Director
UCLA Center for Public Health and Disasters

Angelo Salvucci, Medical Director
Emergency Medical Services Agency
Santa Barbara County

William T. Sams, Chief
Sheriff's Department
County of Los Angeles

***Witnesses Appearing at Little Hoover Commission
Disaster Preparedness Hearing on November 15, 2001***

Diana M. Bontá, Director
Department of Health Services

James J. Gabbert, Chair
California State Emergency
Communications Committee

Jeffrey L. Gidley, Chief
Fiscal and Administration Division
Emergency Medical Services Authority

D.O. "Spike" Helmick, Commissioner
California Highway Patrol

Julie Jones, Emergency Room Nurse
University of California, San Francisco
Medical Center at Parnassus

Mara Manuel, Public Health Nurse
Sacramento County Department of Health
and Human Services

Major General Paul D. Monroe, Jr.
Adjutant General
California National Guard

Nora Silver, Founder and Director
The Volunteerism Project

Stan Statham, President/CEO
California Broadcasters Association

Peter L. Ward, former Chairman
Working Group on Natural Disaster
Information Systems

Notes

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2. Final Report of the Flood Emergency Action Team. June 1997. <<http://rubicon.water.ca.gov/FEATReport120.fdr/featindex.html>>.
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7. Rick DeVecchio. "CATASTROPHE 101. Bay Area volunteers are taking to heart the art of saving lives." SF Gate News. September 24, 2001. <<http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2001/09/24/MN4993.DTL>>.
8. Robert Knouss. "Federal Role in Protection and Response." Conference paper in The new terror: facing the threat of biological and chemical weapons. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, c1999. Page 359.
9. Counties interviewed were Alameda, Orange, Sacramento, San Diego and San Francisco. Contra Costa and Los Angeles counties also were contacted but did not reply.
10. Interviews with Bob Gerber, Assistant Chief, Law Enforcement Branch, Governor's Office of Emergency Services and Andy Mitchell, Deputy Director, Office of Domestic Preparedness, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.
11. Frances Edwards-Winslow, Director of Emergency Preparedness, City of San Jose. Testimony to the Little Hoover Commission. October 25, 2001.
12. Jeffrey L. Gidley, Chief, Fiscal and Administration Division, Emergency Medical Services Authority. Testimony to the Little Hoover Commission. November 15, 2001.
13. Aurelio Rojas. "\$5 Million State Boost for Disease Tracking: The governor plans a one-time emergency allocation to help local health departments' efforts." Sacramento Bee. December 5, 2001.
14. Preliminary Recommendations to Increase Capacity of Local Public Health Departments to Respond to Biological and Chemical Terrorism, County Health Executives Association of California (CHEAC) and California Conference of Local Health Officers (CCLHO). October 25, 2001.

15. County Health Executives Association of California and California Conference of Local Health Officers. Testimony to the California Senate Health and Human Services Committee. November 1, 2001.
16. California Department of Health Services. California Hospital Bioterrorism Response Planning Guide. Draft, September 26, 2001. Section 3 – Attachments, Attachment 1: Communication Plan, pages 116-118. Page 116 directs the Local Health Department (LHD) to make separate calls to OES and DHS. But on page 118, Attachment 1B, the Division of Communicable Disease Control within DHS is directed to notify OES.
17. Roger Richter, Senior Vice President, Professional Services, California Healthcare Association. Testimony to the Assembly Health Committee. November 6, 2001.
18. President George W. Bush. Executive Order Establishing Office of Homeland Security. October 8, 2001.
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20. National Association of County and City Health Officials. Elements of Effective Bioterrorism Preparedness: A Planning Primer for Local Public Health Agencies. January 2001, p. 15.
21. Dr. Steven J. Rottman, Director, UCLA Center for Public Health and Disasters. Testimony to Little Hoover Commission. October 25, 2001.
22. Melvyn L. Sterling, M.D., California Medical Association. Testimony to the Assembly Health Committee. November 6, 2001.
23. Marlin Fitzwater, former White House Press Secretary. Personal communication. December 14, 2001.
24. Robert Knouss. “The Federal Role in Protection and Response.” Conference paper in The new terror: facing the threat of biological and chemical weapons. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, c1999. Page 357.
25. Ariel E. Levite. “Toward a National Defense Strategy.” Conference paper in The new terror: facing the threat of biological and chemical weapons. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, c1999. Page 369.